DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 199 153 SO 013 211

AUTHOR Massell, Gregory J.; Shoup, Paul S.
TITLE Ethnicity and Nationalism. IREX Occasional Papers, Volume 1, Number 3.
INSTITUTION International Research and Exchange Board, New York, N.Y.
SPONS AGENCY Ford Foundation, New York, N.Y.: International Communication Agency, Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for the Humanities (NFAH), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE 80
NOTE 42p.; Papers presented at the Conference on Scholarly Exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe: Two Decades of American Experience (Washington, DC, May 10-13, 1979). For related documents, see SO 013 209-210 and 013-212.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Ethnicity; *Foreign Countries; Foreign Policy; *Nationalism; *Political Issues; Population Growth; Research Needs; *Social Change
IDENTIFIERS USSR; Yugoslavia

ABSTRACT

Two papers examine the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. The first paper assesses the ethnicity in Soviet Central Asia. Because in recent years an increasing number of scholars has been placed in Soviet Central Asia, observation is now combined with commonly held hypotheses to determine regional and national dynamics in the USSR. Soviet Central Asia comprises an area one-half the United States. Major ethnic groups include Turkic (60%), Slavic (25%), and Iranian (5%). Relevant ethnic issues include the complexity of collective identity; saturation of opportunities and positions; manpower needs in other parts of the Soviet Union which have led to the proposal for population transfers; unevenness of birthrates for various ethnic groups; and interethnic relations. The second essay examines the national question in Yugoslavia. Written prior to the death of Tito, it suggests changes likely to occur after his death and considers the role of the United States in the country's affairs. Yugoslavia is characterized by rivalries among the six republics and two autonomous provinces which comprise the federation. The rivalries manifest themselves in economic and political issues. Since 1971 Yugoslav leaders have severely limited all manifestations of nationalism, while permitting the republics and provinces freedom to pursue their economic interests. The federal system grants each unit the right to veto economic and social legislation of which it does not approve. Most likely, the post-Tito period will be marked by greater assertiveness on the parts of the republics and a higher level of instability. The role of the United States is to develop policies aimed at sustaining a stable Yugoslavia and promoting the economic welfare of the country. (Author/KC)

ED199153

Working Papers

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

MAR 25 1981

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Dorothy W Knapp

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Ethnicity and Nationalism

SO 013 211

Conference on
Scholarly Exchanges
with the USSR
and Eastern Europe:

Two Decades of American Experience

May 10-13, 1979

IREX Occasional Papers
International Research & Exchanges Board

IREX, the International Research & Exchanges Board, is the leading American channel for communication with the USSR and Eastern Europe in the social sciences and humanities. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council established IREX in 1968 at the initiative of US universities, the Ford Foundation, and the Department of State, as an independent, non-profit organization to administer America's advanced research exchanges with socialist countries.

IREX programs are supported by grants from the US International Communication Agency, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Ford Foundation, other private foundations, and corporate donors.

Reports on particularly noteworthy collaborative activities and individual research carried out under IREX auspices, as well as summaries of conferences, symposia, and seminars conducted by IREX, are from time to time issued as short publications in the series IREX Occasional Papers. Publication of this series is made possible by a grant from the William and Mary Greve Foundation.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:

Copyright 1980 IREX
IREX Occasional Papers, Volume 1, Number 3

CONTENTS

Preface
Allen H. Kassof 5

Introduction
Paul B. Henze 7

Ethnicity and Nationalism in the USSR:
A Selective Assessment of the Soviet
Central Asian Experience
Gregory J. Massell 11

American Foreign Policy and Nationality and Minority
Problems in Eastern Europe
Paul S. Shoup 33

PREFACE

This IREX Occasional Paper is one of a series summarizing a conference which was organized to evaluate the results of twenty years of scholarly exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The "Conference on Scholarly Exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe: Two Decades of American Experience" was held from May 10-13, 1979, in Washington, D.C., at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. More than 300 participants assessed what U.S. scholars and specialists have learned from the exchange experience in order to communicate their conclusions to the nation's public affairs community--to colleagues in government, business, journalism, and to other professionals concerned with the analysis of Soviet and East European behavior and the formation and consequences of American policy towards that part of the world.

The present collection includes papers presented (and subsequently revised to reflect the discussion and debate at the conference) under the heading of *Ethnicity and Nationalism.*

The introduction to this IREX Occasional Paper was prepared by Mr. Paul B. Henze, staff member of the National Security Council, who chaired the panel at which the original papers were presented. The papers were edited and prepared for publication by Dorothy Knapp and Cynthia Merritt, IREX Information Services.

Allen H. Kassof
Executive Director
June 1980

INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity is not a new concept in international relations. Problems in defining nationality, relations between nationalities and the rights of ethnic minorities became an important subject for both statesmen and scholars during the 19th century, as well as a serious issue in the domestic politics of many countries. It is natural that these subjects should be of concern to IREX grantees, for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are classic regions for the study of such issues. IREX is to be commended for supporting an open-minded and many-sided approach to questions of ethnicity, and for encouraging research valuable to policy-makers.

The subject has become especially pertinent during the past decade when many long-held assumptions about the secondary importance of ethnic considerations for Communist societies have had to be abandoned in the face of new information about how such factors operate in practice. Some peoples reproduce much more rapidly than others, affecting the political and economic equilibrium of their states. Some ethnic groups are culturally more assertive than others. Religion persists as a factor that does not always correspond neatly to ethnic boundaries, though it is sometimes an important component of ethnic self-awareness. Political life is influenced by nationality considerations at many levels and in many direct as well as subtle ways. Ethnic factors have proven to be especially difficult for economic planners and party ideologues to foresee or cope with. They will continue to be an important subject for scholars working on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

We have in the papers presented here two excellent examples of the work IREX grantees have done. Professor Paul Shoup's examination of the national question in Yugoslavia is timely as an introduction to the period of change and redirection which has begun with the passing of Tito. Strictly speaking, all nationalities in Yugoslavia are minorities--since none predominates. The six Slav republican nationalities make up an overwhelming majority of the population, however, though they include one anomaly: Slav Muslims, whose prime distinguishing feature is their religion. Slav Muslims in many

respects, including their high birthrate, have more in common with the non-Slav minority in Yugoslavia, among whom the Albanians are also characterized by an extraordinarily high rate of natural increase. In this, these peoples have much in common with the Muslim nationalities of Soviet Central Asia whose situation Professor Gregory Massell examines in some detail. His essay, like that of Professor Shoup, calls attention to the implications of increased ethnic awareness, assertiveness and sheer numbers for Soviet economic planners and political strategists. Professor Massell deals with another important question which is significant both in Soviet Central Asia and for the countries immediately to the south: the exact nature of ethnic identity. What, exactly, is a Tadzhik? An Uzbek? How much of his identity depends on religion? Culture? Language? Is there a common sense of Turkic identity? How strong are Iranian cultural links?

Both authors present a generous selection of data and hypothesis. While concentrating on Yugoslavia, Professor Shoup has interesting things to say about ethnic minorities elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Here, in contrast to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, one of the difficulties is seen to be defining and counting minorities--numbers depend very much on whose point of view predominates. Both in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union, questions of ethnicity draw the national government into actual and potential conflict with neighboring states. In the Soviet case, this factor is present not only in respect to the countries immediately to the south of its borders, but also in respect to China. The Chinese dimension of the problem has been less in the limelight during the past year because events in Iran and Afghanistan have naturally commanded prime attention. What we have come to realize as a result is that the entire Soviet border from the Caucasus through Inner Asia to the Far East has to be seen less as a rigid fence than as a chalk-line across which influences cross in both directions. These influences radiate outward from the USSR toward kindred peoples beyond the Oxus and the Pamirs, but they also penetrate into the USSR, from the peoples who speak the same languages, share the same culture, practice the same religion to the south or east of the Soviet borders.

There is an enormous agenda here, and unlimited opportunities for stimulating work, for future IREX grantees.

Paul B. Henze
National Security Council

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM IN THE U.S.S.R.:

A Selective Assessment of the Soviet Central Asian Experience

Gregory J. Massell

Soviet Central Asia is significant and fascinating for the insight it gives into problems of ethnicity and nationalism both in the USSR and in the world at large. Central Asia has much more in common with the Third World beyond Soviet frontiers than with other Soviet republics: originally a tradition-bound, underdeveloped region, it has emerged only recently from tribal confines and colonial or semi-colonial dependency. There the roots of overarching ethnic identity--one transcending particular locales, villages, and tribes--may be traced back to the last few decades of tsarist Russian domination, but the "modern" expressions of ethnic awareness in the region assumed their distinct shape immediately before, during, and after the communist revolution. Their subsequent development was the result of intensive interaction between Soviet power and policies and Central Asian social structures and norms. If we assume that the two central operational objectives of the Soviet regime came to be 1) the optimization of the modernizing process through rapid social secularization, mobilization, and economic development, and 2) the maximization of control in part through advancing multinational coordination and integration, the complex process of psycho-cultural and political development underlying the quest for ethnic and national identity in Central Asia begins to be reasonably comprehensible.

Soviet Central Asia encompasses a vast area at the heart of the Eurasian continent, an area of about 1.5 million square miles, almost half the size of the United States. Its terrain is sharply varied and, in large part, forbidding. In 1899, only ten million people lived in this vast area; today, there are close to forty million inhabitants. The region's population includes three principal ethnic groupings: Turkic (about 60 percent, comprising for the most part Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Turkmen); Iranian (about 5 percent, mainly Tadzhiks); and Slavic (25 percent, comprising Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians). All of the region's native ethnic groupings, including also smaller groups of Kurds, Uighurs, Arabs, Persians, and Tatars, have kinsmen and coreligionists throughout the arc of states along the southern rim of the Soviet Union--China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. At the outset of the Soviet revolutionary experiment, the native population, overwhelmingly rural, was only partly sedentary and agricultural, inhabiting oases and lowlands. A significant part was nomadic and pastoral, inhabiting steppes, deserts, and high plateaus. Yet another part, comprising mountaineers, lived on the approaches to the Himalayas.

What was perhaps most important, local societies were largely tribe- or village-oriented, and were organized around kinship units in relatively self-sufficient, widely dispersed communities, by and large along patriarchal and patrilineal lines. All of these communities were deeply steeped in local customs and Islamic religion.

Here, then, the process of revolution and modernization, including a special, Soviet kind of nation-building, involved the confrontation between highly developed, radical, determined, authoritarian communist forces and a cluster of largely traditional Moslem societies, and hence between essentially modern political machines and traditional solidarities and identities based largely on kinship, custom, and religion. The drama of modernization as well as nation-building in Soviet Central Asia thus arose from a huge gap between the social structures existing and those envisioned; from a lack of significantly disintegrated structures ready-made for refashioning; and from great verve and urgency on one side and a deep ambivalence and imperviousness to manipulation on the other.

From this perspective, revolution and modernization in Central Asia may be viewed as a process of deliberate social engineering. This provides an opportunity to analyze "revolutionary" strategies less as attempts by insurgents to topple a particular regime than as maneuvers by incumbents to install a new order, to transform society quickly and fundamentally. I suggest that in no case have the dilemmas of such "insurgency by an incumbent" been as sharply felt by the Soviet regime as in the attempted manipulation of national republican forms--or what I have called "tactical nation-states." The regime attempted to use transitional "national republics" to accelerate the breakdown of traditional solidarities at the grass-roots of society and to attract the cooperation of a new native intelligentsia at the "national" level. Ultimately, it sought to pull older native loyalties and identification patterns upward from the level of kin, village, sect, and tribe to the level of ethnicity and nation, and, from there, to a broadly Soviet, "all-union" loyalty and identity.

The study of this Soviet experience can help us understand problems with very wide ramifications. How, and to what extent, may political power be deliberately used in the revolutionary modernization and simultaneous integration of traditional societies with traditional Islamic structures and life-styles serving as obstacles to engineered change? How, and to what extent, may group dynamics based on nationality, ethnicity, and culture, as well as on kinship and religion, affect the stability, performance, and evolution of the Soviet political system? How, and to what extent, may large-scale socio-cultural change and organizational manipulation in a multi-racial and multi-ethnic milieu be subject to deliberate, planned, and orderly management?

SOME WESTERN ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Western scholarship on various dimensions of this subject by and large has tended to be based on three fairly distinct sets of assumptions:

1) The Soviet Union is essentially a variant of an imperialist, expansionist, neo-colonial empire, and is thus, in effect, a prison of nations. The imperial system is dominated by the interest of Russian nationalism and is driven by the imperatives of a Soviet Russian great-power complex. In this system, a continuous attempt is made to crush and eliminate--or at least to devalue and neutralize--all vestiges of cultural, ethnic, and national identity and autonomy of the conquered peoples, and to exploit the energy and resources of these peoples. Yet in Central Asia, far from being undermined, Turkic and Iranian national consciousness and self-assertiveness are being significantly developed and strengthened precisely by those means that are designed to destroy them: Soviet administrative and modernizing policies.

The repressiveness of Moscow's centralizing pressures, the erosion of tribal elements in Central Asia (and hence the decline of some aspects of traditionalism as a prime constraint on Turkic national identity), and the catalytic effect of the linguistic and national-territorial autonomy of the component Soviet republics--all these factors have contributed to this outcome. Also, there have been unprecedented opportunities for new Turkic secular elites to train for technical, professional, managerial, and leadership roles and for rising contacts between this new intelligentsia and culturally or politically kindred forces abroad. Thus, in their new national garb, indigenous Moslem societies are now far better equipped to resist political imperialism and cultural assimilation than they had been under traditional auspices. At the same time, the dramatically increasing size of these societies--based on the highest birthrates in the Soviet Union by far--is bound to augment their sense of weight and strength. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that the capabilities of the new Turkic elite will be translated into powerful pressures and demands, and the presently budding national solidarities will grow strong enough to challenge the legitimacy of present Soviet political arrangements.

Given the historic example of other colonial empires, it is inescapable that the subjugated minorities will want to act the way other colonized societies have acted. Inspired by the success of the world-wide anti-imperialist struggle and--specifically in Central Asia--by the tremendous resurgence of Islam everywhere, these peoples are bound to assert themselves strongly. They may do so along the lines of particularistic nationalism--that is, as Uzbeks, Turkmen,

or Tadzhiks--utilizing precisely those national-republican institutions and ethos that had been stimulated by Moscow. Or, they may assert themselves along nationalistic yet supra-national lines--that is, according to two historical proclivities: toward a union of all Turkic peoples, as expressed in Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism; or toward a community of believers, as expressed in the Pan-Islamic dream. As a third possibility, the peoples of Central Asia may very well react and challenge Soviet Russian domination on a sub-national level. The region's primordial sensibilities would be reborn and mobilized; there would be a resurgence of those traditional nuclei of faith and trust at the grassroots that are most clearly epitomized by networks of kin, custom, and religious sects.

In any case, the challenge to Soviet Russian hegemony would be of such magnitude as to precipitate a widespread crisis in the system as a whole. Either Moscow will be forced to grant far-reaching concessions to subjected minorities--thus reconstituting the union of republics on fundamentally different terms--or it will face the danger of a national conflict and incipient fragmentation.

Among those who are likely to subscribe to elements of this view are Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Pipes, Jeremy Azrael, Alexandre Bennigsen, John Armstrong, Edward Allworth, and Robert Conquest.

2) The Soviet Union is primarily a highly centralized, unitary state, one that is either incipiently or explicitly totalitarian. While its hegemonial ambitions abroad may be basically unlimited, its policies at home tend to preclude specifically national fragmentation. To be sure, the political cohesiveness of this state is subject to severe nationality strains, due not only to the rigidity and brutality of Soviet controls but also to the rising aspirations of new minority elites. These aspirations are generated primarily by the dislocations and opportunities resulting both from the process of modernization and from Soviet nationality policy. The system's repressive features are not confined to any one nationality, while at least some of its benefits are shared by all. The regime's power is quite adequate to control the tensions its policies generate, and it has the capacity to augment its broadly repressive and integrative thrust. It can do so, most obviously, through the manipulation of direct or indirect concomitants of modernization--population exchange, technological and industrial development, urbanization, bureaucratization, politicization of cultural and educational media, etc.

Thus, while minority resentment of external domination might be expected to persist, minority nationalities are unlikely to become significant disruptive forces in the absence of the weakening or collapse of the system's political center, or of the Soviet Union's defeat in war. Precisely because of the state's totalitarian proclivities, social cleavages in the Soviet Union operate primarily

along professional and incipient class lines; they cut across and undermine ethnic solidarities. In such a system, for example, an Uzbek policeman is likely to have much more in common with his Russian counterpart than with his Uzbek kinsmen. The road ahead, while fraught with recurring tensions, is likely to be the road to a transcendence and gradual weakening of the minorities' national consciousness and ethnocentric loyalties.

Among those likely to subscribe to some dimensions of this argument are Frederick Barghoorn, Barrington Moore, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond Bauer. With some specific caveats, Brzezinski, Azrael, and Armstrong might share some of these assumptions, though probably not the conclusions drawn from them.

3) The Soviet Union is essentially an authoritarian bureaucratic state and continental commonwealth with modernizing dispositions. While it does compete abroad for power and influence, its policies are basically those of a reasonably responsible superpower claiming for itself the global role and status befitting its position, weight, and strength. At home, its policies are marked by a gradual if uneven retreat from Stalinism in just about all realms. Its continued commitment to modernization is matched by some relaxation of controls, by some deconcentration of central power, by a de-emphasis of arbitrary intervention from above, and by a corresponding reliance on the consultative and participatory input of relevant elites and sectors of society--including, on a reasonably equal footing, the elites and citizens from minority republics. While the system's evolving characteristics make it increasingly resemble a "bureaucracy writ large," some of those characteristics are making it assume the shape and functions of "institutional pluralism." By definition, the system's bureaucratic and pluralistic imperatives tend to cut across minority national domains, making such national loyalties, and certainly local nationalism, increasingly irrelevant.

By the same token, the sweeping effect of Soviet modernizing initiatives, combined with the state's growing commitment to popular welfare, is leading to a progressive, relatively frictionless absorption of minority nationalities into the dominant Soviet-Russian culture, and to the growing cohesion of the multi-national political system. This process is augmented by a reasonably (or increasingly) equitable and rational allocation of responsibilities, resources, and rewards among the nationalities; economic interdependence, political stability, and military security are potentially of mutual advantage to all concerned. In such a context, even if some traces of Islamic or Turkic sensibilities persist, and some groups retain ethnic features or national awareness longer than others--with such sensitivities focusing on issues of linguistic autonomy in local education and communications--distinctly separate ethnic, and certainly national, identities are doomed to extinction.

For that matter, even if some ethnic groups should become willing and able to distance themselves from the established multi-national system and even dream of sovereignty and secession, it would not take too long for them to come face to face with the critical facts at hand. Among the positive incentives to remain in the system are the very considerable benefits of belonging to a union wherein issues of common defense and rational economic specialization and complementarity make membership attractive. The negative incentives should be no less persuasive: any group seriously contemplating actual secession--certainly any Middle Eastern or Asian group, including Georgians, Azerbaidzhanis, Armenians, Uzbeks, Turkmen, or Tadzhiks--would immediately incur enormous risks. It would be difficult to decide which risk would be the most grave: the risk of exposure to political pressures by, or political upheavals in, states like Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan; the risk of inviting Chinese hegemonial designs; or perhaps worst of all, the risk of rivalry and conflict both between newly sovereign neighboring nationalities (such as between Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Tadzhiks, on irredentist and other grounds) and within their fold (in every republic, a particular ethnic majority lives side by side with a host of potentially restive minorities). Given such a correlation of incentives and disincentives, it is very doubtful that any ethnic elite would want to lead its countrymen on a secessionist adventure--especially when the withdrawal from under Moscow's umbrella would immediately endanger the very legitimacy, power, status, and perquisites enjoyed by the new "socialist intelligentsia," a local ruling stratum that after all owes its very existence to the Soviet regime.

Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that the patterns of political development and socio-cultural integration (including a measure of assimilation) elsewhere--for example, in the United Kingdom, in the United States, or in Switzerland--can serve as adequate guides to the evolution of the Soviet multi-national state.

Among those who would probably subscribe to some aspects of this view are Cyril Black, Alfred Meyer, Vernon Aspaturian, Alec Nove, Jerry Hough, George Breslauer, and Geoffrey Wheeler.

These three sets of views tend to emphasize different aspects of the same two basic components of Soviet policy: modernization and control. Those who stress national assimilation as one of the outcomes tend to extrapolate from what they assume to be the experience of most Western (metropolitan) multiethnic states. Those who emphasize national differentiation in the USSR tend also to extrapolate from Western experience--but of a very different kind; they stress the experience of Western rule in colonial lands. In effect, they ask: if the acceleration of a world-wide revolution of modernization in the twentieth century has indeed contributed to the well-nigh uni-

versal collapse of imperial rule, and to the emergence of proudly ethnocentric, nationality-oriented forces everywhere, why should the Soviet multi-national union, so obviously coercive rather than voluntary in nature, remain exempt from this process?

It seems fair to say that, with few exceptions, neither side in this argument has entirely avoided conjecture or accumulated sufficient supporting data and evidence. All those who pioneered the study of Soviet history and politics were keenly aware of the enormous difficulties involved in gathering meaningful data and generalizing about the operation of the Soviet state and about the attitudes and behavior of its elites and masses. Now, after nearly thirty years of systematic scholarly work on all realms of Soviet life, we are still compelled to build many of our arguments by proxy, to study a system and a culture at a distance. With the palpable sense of terrain often missing, with the intimate sense of actual realities at a premium, we are obliged to rely, more than we would like to, on extrapolation, deduction, inference, hypothesis, theory--and sometimes pure conjecture. In all this, we hope we can at least approximate reality, and hope that our approximations are not wholly devoid of common sense.

This is not merely a matter of lacking quantifiable data. Ironically, in a number of fields, we have a fair abundance of statistical data and, in putting them to good use, we frequently do not have to go too far afield. But the moment we wish to go beyond the gross indices, to inquire into the motive forces in Soviet society--to evaluate the quality of human morale in the system; the types and mainsprings of human beliefs, values, loyalties, commitments; the determinants of human identity, needs, expectations, demands--at such a moment we know how relatively little we know. We also know that, in order to build and maintain a viable understanding of these issues--issues that are, surely, absolutely vital for the Soviet system's performance--we must indeed go very far afield. We have no choice but to try and try again to encounter human realities, as much as is possible *in vivo*.

In recent years, we have been able to place increasing numbers of American scholars for fairly extended sojourns in Soviet Central Asia. Their research, observations, interviews, contacts, and impressions are beginning to make it possible for us to test our ideas about regional and national dynamics in the USSR. Their enterprise is at last beginning to provide us, not so much with hard and fast answers, as with better ways to formulate our questions and ask them in real situations. It is providing us with ways to refine our analytical schemes and to ground our theoretical abstractions in some samples of empirical reality.

ACCESS TO SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TESTING OF ASSUMPTIONS

Even a fairly brief sojourn in Central Asia sensitizes us to the extraordinary complexity of the issues at stake. It certainly challenges at once our temptation to evaluate local trends by extrapolation from the experience of other political and cultural contexts, be it the relatively peaceful experience of the United Kingdom or the United States, or the more or less violent experience of formerly colonial areas. Neither of these two cases can serve as an easily fitting model for an analysis of Soviet Central Asia. Let me briefly review a few of the relevant issues in the light of the recent experience of American exchange scholars visiting various areas of the Soviet Union, including Central Asia, experience gained in the course of multi-disciplinary research and varied societal exposure.

Collective Identity

Collective identity is surely the most difficult problem of all. Yet, even in this area, cursory societal exposure has shown how much more complex the issue is than allowed for in our earlier generalizations. We find neither wholesale destruction nor unambiguous flourishing and consolidation of local, national, or supra-national identities. Contrary to expectations over the last several decades, supra-national bonds of a Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic kind show the fewest signs of viability, at least in the foreseeable future. Even the most innocuous contacts among sister republics show both ignorance and caution on all sides. At the same time, while the native secular intelligentsia's emotional preoccupations tend to focus on strictly local traditions and customs without overt reference to Islam, its functional and professional concerns, including those pertaining to advancement and career, tend to draw it towards ethnic and national levels of cooperation and self-definition. In fact, one may characterize such a tendency as traditional sensibility in national garb.

There can be little question that Soviet policy over the last sixty years has had something to do with this phenomenon. Both the disincentives of central controls and pressures and the lure of Soviet-generated opportunities have led to a certain cultural ambivalence on the part of educated natives, making it difficult for them to decide which components of Turko-Iranian ethnicity, Central Asian tradition, and Islamic religious civilization are meaningful, desirable, and viable, as well as safe enough--indeed, "authentic" enough--under the new circumstances to constitute foci for renewed attachments.

Cultural and political ambivalence has by no means led to cultural and political emasculation. Quite the contrary is true. Burgeoning pride and self-confidence on the part of native elites is evident

everywhere. Local cadres (technical, scientific, administrative, and often even political) are remarkably frank in their contacts with foreign colleagues, especially when a modicum of mutual respect and trust is established. Symptomatically the greatest source of pride is almost invariably broached without prompting and at the very beginning of a private discussion. It has to do with the recent meteoric rise of local birthrates. People whose professional interests are quite remote from issues of demographic statistics proudly correct the visitor's impressions of the "real coefficients of our population growth"--and cite glowing projections for the future. The same people who at official meetings blandly insist on the reality of a "single Soviet culture," later extol the "unique virtues, health and beauty" of local cultural traditions as "the real reason" for the population explosion.

Two distinct and parallel phenomena are apparent here. One the one hand, there is an ever more self-confident quest for, and awareness of, elements of a cultural and ethnic identity. On the other hand, there are still persistent difficulties in the way of actually amalgamating dispersed and disparate individual and small-group perceptions into an overarching whole, one that could take on the shape and qualities of a genuine, large-scale social solidarity.

Role-Saturation

The same Soviet policies concerning modernization, minority control, and administration that are designed both to erode traditional commitments and to integrate minority groups in a larger Soviet whole are having some very important and unanticipated consequences of their own. Some of these consequences tend to strengthen rather than weaken local self-perceptions as separate ethnic communities. Simultaneous Soviet commitments to optimal modernization and to maximum control in a multi-national context are not necessarily consistent.

Soviet modernization and nationality policies are inducing in Central Asia two mutually contradictory developments. The lure of new life opportunities opened up by modernization, combined with new opportunities for education and training in preparation for new social, economic, and political roles, has triggered the emergence on a massive scale of native specialist elites. Partly as a result of Soviet administrative and nationality policy, there has been a sustained influx into Central Asia of European, especially Slavic, settlers, professionals and supervisory political personnel. Therefore, two growing streams of people are arriving simultaneously to fill the new system of roles and opportunities. Since the 1960s, the birthrate among native Moslems has skyrocketed, making it all but certain that Moslem pressure on available positions will increase. Barring fundamental changes in present arrangements, the pressure

of the two massive human streams may soon outstrip the system's capacity to absorb them, resulting in a saturation of role opportunities and status positions in Central Asia.

One of the results of such saturation of opportunities and positions may well be a condition of growing frustration on the part of natives who are trained for and led to expect specific life opportunities, including professional and authoritative positions, yet find such opportunities unreal or unobtainable.

On the spot familiarization shows that such frustration has indeed cropped up in a number of cases. It is reflected in a growing disposition, even on the part of native political elites, to demand a semblance of proportional national representation in the network of professional, technical, managerial, and administrative positions in local republics. There are indications that Moscow has already found it necessary to accommodate these demands to some extent, though in special ways. Native personnel have indeed been permitted in selected cases to dislodge non-natives from long-held positions--which is presumably calculated to show the regime's good faith and enhance native gratitude. However, many, if not most, of the dislodged people turn out to have been Jews. It is not unreasonable to assume that such a turn of events has been intended to deflect potential native hostility away from the regime and its Slavic representatives in the region, and toward the minority group with the weakest constituency. In fact, in Central Asia the regime has deliberately encouraged the joining of two issues: the indictment of Jewish "overrepresentation" in the local apparatus as a prime obstacle to native self-fulfillment at home has been linked with attacks on Jewish Zionism as the enemy and despoiler of Islam abroad.

Needless to say, such an approach to "nativization," while so far successful, has its built-in limits. For one thing, there are not enough Jews in significant positions in the region to serve this role indefinitely. For another thing, the rapidly rising native elites will, sooner or later, have to come face to face with the fact that the vast majority of valued positions in the area are staffed by Slavs, especially Russians and Ukrainians. It is precisely at such a time of perceived deprivation and discrimination that inchoate and disparate perceptions of a separate cultural and ethnic identity may most readily be fused into a powerful sense of solidarity.

Manpower Needs and Population Transfers

In the last five years, it has become apparent to Western analysts that three interrelated trends in Soviet society and the economy--all of them involving Central Asia--will inescapably demand the regime's intervention. First, a sharpening manpower shortage has

become manifest in the USSR's traditional industrial regions in West-Central Russia and Siberia. Second, the persistent concentration of Central Asia's native population in the rural hinterlands, and the fairly strict limits placed on local agricultural expansion by a shortage of water and tillable land, have inexorably led to early signs of rural overpopulation and underemployment. Third, the enormous rise in native Moslem birthrates--concentrated as it is in the traditionalist countryside--has lent all the greater impetus to rural overpopulation and commensurate underemployment.

The regime has a number of obvious options in dealing with the situation. It could, for example, encourage the millions of Slavs presently living in Central Asia--and possessing precisely those skills needed most in Russia--to "return," in effect, to their homeland in the north. The regime could also stimulate the shift of some industries to labor-rich Central Asia. But there are reasons to suppose that neither of these options would be easily palatable to Moscow: the first, because of its political and security implications in the region;
efficiency and rationality. While there are as yet no clear indications of a firm and final official decision in the matter, the slant of tentative proposals aired to date--perhaps floated as trial balloons before a decisive move--points to some of Moscow's preferences. Central Asia is now seen as a "labor-surplus" area, and hence one with "tangible manpower reserves" suitable to alleviate the labor shortage elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, some cautiously-worded proposals are being advanced, citing the need--on grounds of "rational distribution of population," as well as "rational utilization of labor pools"--to initiate large-scale population transfers from Central Asia to European Russia and Siberia.

While the factual bases of these trends and policy options have become well known, it was not feasible until quite recently to evaluate the subjective meaning of these developments to the people likely to be most affected by them. The recent presence of American scholars in Central Asia has definitely helped us to begin such an evaluation. The initial responses of Central Asians (mostly scholars, professionals, and middle level officials) consulted by American scholars in this matter have been remarkably homogeneous and outspoken. The responses, all negative, ranged from subtle irony to apprehension and hostility. They all stress, in no uncertain terms, the traditional links of the Turkic peoples to their Central Asian homeland, and the irrationality of attempting to move people to the machines, rather than the machines to the people.

One especially forceful criticism of schemes of economic rationalization was offered as follows: "They are really trying to warm up an old, discredited dish--the 'amalgamation' of republics into so-called rational economic regions, such as the 'cotton region,' to

begin with. Which means, as everyone knows, the abolition, the dissolution of union republics. Do you know what will happen when this is done? Lenin knew, that's why he fought hard to help us get these national homelands. When a peasant sweats over his land, when a worker builds an irrigation canal, when a writer puts his pen to paper--they are all motivated and filled with pride, because they know they are laboring in the world of the forefathers, they are improving a world that's *their own*, that's closest to the skin and heart. Dissolve the republics--and you take away this strong incentive to build and create. Who will want to lift a finger then? Of course, in the conditions of fully realized communism, when human nature itself will change, as we hope, there may come a time to consider such a thing. But that time has not yet come. We'll make certain that the party is not taken in...."

If we have known virtually nothing until recently about initial native responses in this matter, we have known very little about Russian views either. Suffice it to say that informal sampling of opinion in the Russian areas has also unearthed virtual unanimity on this subject. Just as the Moslems are against leaving their ancestral lands, so are the Russians unenthusiastic about receiving such a large non-Russian influx. Again and again, the refrain--on the part of Russian managers, engineers, technicians, and teachers, as well as ordinary housewives--was the same: "Those who talk about such things, they must be mad."

Differential Birthrates

Nothing has attracted more attention in recent years than the issue of differential birthrates. For Central Asians surging birthrates mean many things: the health and self-confidence of their people; the conquest of their homelands' vast yet unpopulated expanse; the greater availability of working hands to cultivate valuable cash crops; the fulfillment of traditional injunctions to multiply and to glory in one's expanding family. Indeed, they give the impression that to raise more children is both the most personally fulfilling and collectively the most worthy, even patriotic, thing to do.

In contrast, Russians have greeted Central Asia's population explosion with some unease. Russian birthrates have come to be among the lowest in the Soviet Union without near-term prospects for improvement. Recent prognoses include the following: a decline in the proportional weight of Russians in Soviet population to well below fifty percent within two decades; the corresponding rise of Turkic peoples to a size well over twenty percent of the overall population; the dramatic rise in the Turkic portion of the Soviet Union's projected labor pool; the still more dramatic rise in the

proportional weight of young Turkic age-cohorts in the overall pool of youths subject to recruitment into the Soviet army over the next two decades. These patterns have created some real apprehension within the Soviet leadership, and that apprehension is clearly mirrored in the reactions and comments of the Russian populace.

At least two sets of proposals are currently being circulated. One has to do with the massive transfer of Central Asians to European Russia and Siberia. The other calls for an exploration of ways to deal with the "unevenness" of the Soviet Union's birthrates. It calls for nothing less than the planned encouragement of births where they lag, and their planned discouragement in regions where they are "unbalanced."

The first of these two sets of proposals--concerning mass migration--is highly problematic. The second touches on ground that is most delicate. The encouragement or enforcement of systematic birth control in Central Asia, at a time when it is discouraged elsewhere, is likely to be perceived as a repressive act and a distinct threat to local cultures. Accordingly, it is likely to fan, in Central Asia, precisely those fires of suspicion and resentment that Moscow has been trying to dampen for over fifty years.

Inter-Ethnic Relations

It is a safe assumption that tensions between antagonistic ethnic groups tend to be directly correlated with the extent and intensity of the interaction of these groups, especially if that interaction involves competition for valued positions and roles. Tensions between native Central Asians and non-native groups, whose greatest concentration is in the region's larger cities, are likely to rise as the region's growing secular elites, working class, and service sectors try to move in growing numbers from the rural to the urban settings.

The regime has so far controlled this issue by carefully restricting access to cities. In Central Asia the pattern of these restrictions has differed from that elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Slavic professionals of all kinds--not to speak of political and administrative personnel--arriving there on assignment apparently find it markedly easier than natives to obtain urban residential permits and living space.

On the whole, the regime has succeeded in maintaining an outward appearance of orderliness and correctness in relations between ethnic groups, especially in official and public situations. These are sometimes marked by a show of ritualized cordiality and placidity. However, it is not surprising to note parallel phenomena:

there is little social intercourse after work hours between natives and Slavs; the rate of intermarriage between the two groups is among the lowest in the Soviet Union.

When ordinary Russians are asked about their situation in Central Asia, they will often compare it with exile from the Russian center. As justification, they will explain that they moved there because of the relative ease in securing work and living permits in an urban setting. It is, they argue, much easier to make a career quickly there, much cheaper to live, and one enjoys a comparatively higher material, if definitely not cultural, standard of living.

The Central Asians themselves will often resent the indifference and casual condescension of the Slavic newcomers. Differing systems of cultural values and behavioral patterns inevitably generate social tensions. The sensitivities of the Central Asians to slights and perceived slights to their ancient cultural heritage exacerbate those tensions. Western specialists have now become familiar with these patterns from experience in urban centers and the large towns. We know next to nothing about the attitudes and values of the vast majority of native inhabitants who continue to live in rural areas.

All the same, judging from these and other contexts, it would seem that not only have ethnic tensions survived under the brittle surface of ritual harmony, but they will almost certainly be aggravated by new social and economic developments in the region.

CONCLUSIONS

Given what we know about the fit of Soviet--and especially Central Asian--national minorities in the overall system, it should be no exaggeration to say that their attitudes are likely to become of great, perhaps central, importance to the stability and performance of the Soviet state. The effects of Soviet policies in this realm have been markedly contradictory in their effect, reinforcing and stabilizing the overarching political system while at the same time often contributing to its destabilization. Let me very briefly explore the interaction of these policies:

1) The establishment of national republics in the USSR--what I have called tactical nation-states--has unquestionably had a stabilizing effect. Most important, it has served to attract the participation and cooperation of a new secular intelligentsia, most of whose members could be expected to be both grateful and dependent, since they owed their positions of real or apparent authority directly to Moscow. In at least one sense, however, the operation of what had been intended as surrogate national structures has acquired a de-

stabilizing potential as well. Having established ethnicity related to a particular language, history, and territory as an important criterion for the self-definition of groups, the regime has found it difficult to prevent the tendency of these groups to invest their ethnicity with increasingly pervasive meaning, and to assert their pride, identity, and interests, precisely, within the framework of nationality. Having established national republics as tactical and strictly temporary mobilizational devices--to be disposed of as soon as feasible--the regime has found national minorities not only clinging to their national structures but actively countering any and all proposals to dissolve them. Thus, national republics, instead of marking a passing political phase, have become an institutional fixture, one that ethnic groups are learning to use to defend their interests.

2) Soviet politics has often been described as both totalitarian and unauthentic--at least in the sense that popular participation in the system is manipulated rather than genuine, and the political superstructure does not represent the societal bases, though it tries to appear as if it does. These very features of the political system may have been stabilizing, perhaps especially vis-à-vis national minorities. One may indeed speak of a kind of totalitarian equality; the totalitarian experience, including its repressiveness, has been universal rather than confined to one or another national group. At the same time, even when the life opportunities offered by this system have been meager, their allocation to ethnic groups has been reasonably egalitarian. Moreover, even at its most unauthentic, the system has gone to great lengths to develop structures indicative of its solicitude, responsiveness, and authenticity, especially vis-à-vis ethnic groups. For example, it has encouraged the mass development of talents and energies among all nationalities. Also, in ways especially important in the Central Asian milieu, it has allowed some social sectors, including elements of family, village, and clan life, as well as of custom and religion, to retain some semblance of traditional importance. More important still, some aspects of Soviet authority patterns may be said to be fairly congruent with traditional Central Asian patterns. These include authoritarian and paternalistic leadership styles, emphasis on the group rather than on the individual, ritualized public recognition for requisite behavior, and elaborate ceremonial forms of mass participation. All these factors have mitigated incipient tensions, lending a measure of stability to society and politics.

At the same time, some of the consequences of totalitarianism (or authoritarianism, depending on one's perspective) and unauthenticity have come to acquire destabilizing dimensions as well. The post-Stalin thaw in nationality policy and Russia's growing involvement in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa have encouraged, especially in Central Asia, a veritable renaissance in local literatures, his-

torical self-explorations, and some cultural traditions. Almost simultaneously, however, Moscow's renewed proclivity for regimentation and retrenchment, with an emphasis on the need for minorities to "converge" and "merge" in a unitary state, has led to barely concealed frustration in the ranks of the local intelligentsia. The emergence of a subtly expressed pecking order of ethnic groups in the USSR has definitely added to the frustration and humiliation felt by minority elites. In this sense, the growing scope for articulating local national interests and grievances by Central Asian republics may serve as an important barometer of growing self-consciousness under pressure.

3) In some respects, Soviet modernization policies have had a stabilizing effect on interethnic relationships in the USSR, and hence on the political system as a whole. Soviet operational norms make no fundamental distinctions between the human talents and energies that must go into the process of modernization; in principle, racial, national, and ethno-cultural discrimination in the context of modernizational tasks stand in direct contradiction to Soviet objectives. Rapid material development and relatively egalitarian distribution of the fruits of this development among all nationalities certainly mitigate the rigor of controls. Indeed, it is precisely the regime's commitment to this pattern of reasonably equalized development and distribution in the process of modernization--operative, as it is, in the Russian "mother country" as well as in other ethno-cultural realms of the super-state--that distinguishes the Soviet system most clearly from classical colonial empires.

However, this very process of modernization is also responsible for the crystallization, especially in Central Asia, of forces with distinctly destabilizing potentialities. The requirements of modernization and interethnic cooperation have led masses of men and women to shed traditional ties, to acquire needed skills, and to move to fill the newly available roles and positions, in the expectation that these positions are without exception theirs to fill. However, the imperatives of security and control have dictated the continued entrenchment of Slavs in authoritative, supervisory, and management positions in minority republics, especially in Central Asia. These conflicting imperatives may well lead to role-saturation in the region and deepening native frustration.

Such a possibility need not be decisive in the evolution of ethnic solidarity and national self-assertion in Central Asia. The Soviet system has often shown great astuteness in controlling and adjusting to ethnic tensions and demands, and a great deal of sobriety and pragmatism, especially vis-à-vis its Asian minorities, in adapting to complex realities. One of this system's most characteristic, even unique, proclivities has been the reliance on deliberate and large-scale social engineering in the development and control of its multi-national domain. The regime has rarely been caught napping when unfavorable trends have emerged.

This has been apparent in the regime's cooptation of native secular elites. In Central Asia, even more than elsewhere, this cooptation has been both massive and multifaceted. As even disaffected Central Asians must admit, Soviet mobilization and training of new generations in the region and the provision of life opportunities to all have been on a scale undreamt of under the rule of khans, emirs, and tsars before the revolution. It is also apparent without their saying so--perhaps without their even realizing it--that Soviet strategies of recruitment and cooptation have been both imaginative and in many ways successful. These strategies have included substitutes for, and viable alternatives to, full-scale political participation in the network of authoritative, decision-making posts.

These substitutes may be found in the veritable mushrooming of officially sponsored "cultural" enterprises of a kind not expected to contribute to the rise of local nationalism. Coinciding with Moscow's rapidly growing involvement in the politics of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in the last two decades, local academies of science and allied institutions have expanded enormously. Humanities, culture, and society have been emphasized much more than science in these institutions, and the size and sumptuousness of their structures are striking and almost disproportionate.

For the first time in Soviet history, two related trends may be noted in Central Asia. First, native cultural cadres, starting with those in the academies, are specializing in the languages and cultures of neighboring and akin societies, including Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, and those of the Middle East and North Africa. Second, there is ever more visible recruitment of members of local elites for service in the societies just mentioned. At this point, their assigments include diplomacy, "cultural representation" by writers, artists, journalists, and scholars, as well as, of late, participation in special service situations. As to the latter, among those in the first wave of Soviet advisory and supervisory personnel to arrive in Afghanistan immediately following the Marxist revolution, Central Asians were very heavily represented.

These are but some indications of Moscow's pragmatic and systematic attempts to manage potential nationalist pressures at home and also find a place for local recruits in important ventures abroad. There are, however, other possibilities of a kind both unanticipated and less manageable. If the Soviet regime chooses to resort to rigid prescriptions and Draconian repressions on some critical issue of passionate interest to the Central Asians, the results might well be unpredictable.

Catalysts for such a confrontation may well exist in the situations already described here: problems of differential birthrates, man-

power transfers, role-saturation, and interethnic relations. The peculiar combination and interaction of the latter two issues may ultimately determine the shape and strength of native self-assertion. While the prime imperatives of Soviet modernization and nationality policy have been to turn the USSR into a homogeneous, continental system, predicated on the gradual absorption and assimilation of minorities into the supra-national Soviet fold, some very different informal dispositions have also been at work. These dispositions compete directly with formally enunciated values, and may have a decidedly negative impact on the political system. Specifically, there is an ever more apparent tendency within the confines of each republic to assign native Central Asian cadres to positions of public esteem rather than political responsibility, and to exclude them almost completely from all decision-making bodies at the center, and hence from membership in the union's power elite.

At a certain critical juncture for the political system in Central Asia, the high-pressure, purposively assimilative process has tended to go hand in hand with a deliberate freeze in the process of assimilation. Accordingly, the rate of social mobilization in the region may come to exceed the rate of effective assimilation. Central Asian elites may come to see themselves as relegated to a precarious interstitiality in politics and culture, instead of being designated for full membership in the ruling stratum. They may come to see themselves as designated to be political and cultural brokers in their own societies as well as in the Third World. Even those who would have preferred to associate themselves with the dominant Soviet Russian culture, but find themselves suspended between a world they had left and one that does not fully accept them, may feel compelled to re-establish ties with their original ethnicity and culture. The region's elites may find it both necessary and possible to re-establish ties with the masses of their compatriots in villages and towns--who, in turn, may be more amenable to the renewed relationship precisely because of the shared sense of deprivation and neglect.

The Central Asians may be driven by Moscow's possible insensitivity or intransigence and by their own new self-image toward ever sharper self-differentiation on ethnic grounds. To the extent that they acquire an increasingly sophisticated comprehension of the system as a whole and of their position in it, their reaction is likely to take the form of increasingly specific, self-conscious, and more aggressive demands on the system and its center: demands for more genuine ethnic participation in the system's roles and rewards, for broader and more meaningful jurisdiction in the local management and, perhaps most subtly, for recognition of the intrinsic value and validity of some customary, ethical, and esthetic components of local cultures and life-styles. Significant repercussions are

likely in either case: if the Soviet regime finds it possible to grant the minorities an institutional capacity to express demands and overcome inequalities, the system itself will be markedly, albeit gradually, transformed; if, on the other hand, some of the present trends are allowed to continue, ethnicity and nationality may well become--perhaps more rapidly in Central Asia than elsewhere in the USSR--the most chronically destabilizing factors in Soviet politics.

As should be evident from this brief review, IREX's initiative in expanding exchanges to cover minority nationalities has made it possible for us to gain a far more nuanced, realistic, and comprehensive perception of problems of ethnicity and nationality in the Soviet Union than was possible earlier. Given the unquestionable importance of these issues--given, indeed, their pivotal role--in determining the stability and performance of the Soviet system, it is surely imperative that every effort be made to strengthen our capabilities in this area.

By this I do not mean simply placing more of our scholars in Central Asia and elsewhere, though this goes without saying. I mean the creation through IREX of the kind of enabling conditions that would further our chances for successful research in minority areas. Let me mention a few such conditions:

1) the inclusion in our formal or informal agreements with the Soviet Union of arrangements that would assure our scholars reasonably direct and stable access to the academies, universities, institutes, ministries, as well as clearly specified archives of national republics; 2) the systematic and careful preparation of our younger scholars for field research in the USSR, including in addition to fluency in Russian a working knowledge of the language, history, and culture of at least one minority nationality. To the extent that this requires proportionately greater investments of time and money on the part of young scholars, ways should be explored to make such investment possible and fruitful. And 3) the development, in a partnership that includes government, universities, professional scholarly associations, business, and trade-union associations, of a supportive infrastructure capable of sustaining the nation's research capability in areas of long-term national interest and concern, such as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Scholars prepared to engage in critically important research face an increasingly tight academic market. Young scholars, in particular, must be able to make long-term research commitments without undue fear that this very considerable investment of time and effort may nonetheless leave them without prospects for academic employment upon return from a completed assignment. It seems both legitimate

and fitting to suggest that, just as government agencies have recently found it appropriate to help in the establishment of a National Council for Soviet and East European Research, so might a partnership of government, universities, and public organizations find it both necessary and appropriate to establish, over the long term, national research institutes for the study of critical issues and areas of the world, including those involving the Soviet Union and its allies. At a minimum, it is imperative that broadly equivalent ways be found both to augment the research potential of existing university institutes and to expand the research functions of government agencies. Such programs and capabilities should be recognized as a critical, indeed indispensable, national asset.

GREGORY J. MASSELL is a professor of political science at Hunter College of the City University of New York and also chairman of its Russian Studies Graduate Program. A graduate of Columbia University, he received his M.A. (1954) and Ph.D. (1966) degrees from Harvard University. In 1975 he participated in the American Council of Learned Societies-Soviet Academy of Sciences exchange, which is administered by IREX. The author of *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929* (Princeton University Press, 1974), he is currently working on Communist strategies of social engineering and modernization in Soviet Central Asia from 1930 to 1970.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

AND NATIONALITY AND MINORITY PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Paul S. Shoup

Ethnic and national rivalries have profoundly influenced the social, political and economic development of Eastern Europe. National controversy is so closely associated with the history of the region that the very name of Eastern Europe conjures up images of fierce national hatreds, persecution of national minorities, even genocide.*

The contemporary nationalities problems of Eastern Europe have a number of ramifications for American foreign policy. At the first level, the United States is directly involved in setting immigration quotas, in taking a position on human rights issues (above all, the question of Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe), and now in coping with the activities of disaffected nationalist groups, especially Yugoslav extremists who have begun to resort to terrorism in the United States.

At a second level, the United States finds itself in the position of an observer, albeit an intensely interested one, of nationality and minority problems which do not involve the U.S. directly but are important in shaping American relations with both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The off-again, on-again controversy between Romania and the Soviet Union over Bessarabia, ceded by Romania to the Soviet Union in 1941, is a much publicized example. The United States has wisely remained aloof from this dispute, but it has certainly shaped American perceptions of Romania as a country seeking to free itself from Soviet tutelage, and in the process influenced U.S. policy toward the Ceausescu regime.

---

* Before World War II, national minorities made up about 22.8 percent of the population of Eastern Europe as the region is presently defined, that is, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia as presently constituted. Today, as the result of boundary changes, war losses, and population resettlements, the number has been greatly reduced. It is impossible to give a precise figure on the size of the minority population in Eastern Europe today: at a maximum the minorities number 10,500,000 persons, or 8.1 percent of the population. At a minimum, relying solely on official data and excluding gypsies, Jews, and other smaller ethnic groups without recognized minority status, the number is around 7,533,000, or 5.8 percent of the total.

At a third level, the United States is concerned with nationality and minority disputes because they may upset the stability of Eastern Europe and strengthen the Soviet hold over it. This country has sought within careful bounds to encourage the legitimate national aspirations of the peoples of Eastern Europe as a way of helping them escape Soviet domination. This policy necessarily entails a sensitivity to the problems of the national minorities and to relations among the major Slav nationalities in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Yet it is clear that, whatever short-term gains the United States may realize from national disputes among the Eastern European Communist states, the Soviet Union ultimately benefits. Controversy over nationality and minority issues tends to obscure the more basic question of Soviet domination of the area and thus provides Moscow with an opportunity to manipulate national feelings which the United States cannot match. These observations apply with particular force to Yugoslavia. Here the national question in Eastern Europe comes into sharpest focus, and here American interests are most affected.

The National Question in Yugoslavia

The most recent information on the national composition of Yugoslavia dates from 1971. At that time, the six Slav nationalities, or "nations" (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Slav Moslems) made up 86.7 percent of the population; the national minorities, 11.4 percent. There were also 273,000 "Yugoslavs" who, in accord with Yugoslav practice, were not called a nationality. The Serbs, the largest nationality at 39.7 percent in 1971, had begun to lose ground, principally to the Slav Moslems (8.4 percent) and Albanians (6.4 percent). The census confirmed the overall decline of the three major nationalities--the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes--who together made up 70.0 percent of the population, compared with 74.5 percent at the time of the first postwar census in 1948. This decline was more than matched by an increase of the Moslem population (Moslem Slavs, Albanians, and Turks) which grew from 11.1 percent in 1961 to 15.4 percent in 1971. This growth was in large part due to demographic factors, but it was also the result of the recognition of the Slav Moslems as a "nation" in their own right before the 1971 census.

These figures attest to the ethnic diversity of Yugoslavia and to the manner in which the problem of relations among the six Slav nationalities overlaps with that of the national minorities. To these two dimensions of the national question there must be added a third--that of rivalries among the six republics and two autonomous provinces that constitute the Yugoslav federation. These rivalries manifest themselves on the economic front--in the disputes over aid to underdeveloped republics, or in the closing off of republic markets to competition, to cite two examples--and also over the operation of the federal system.

Yugoslavia to a certain extent remains an artificial creation, the product of attempts to find a home for the South Slav peoples, each with its distinct cultural and national history. The difficulties inherent in this situation have been magnified manyfold by the long-standing dispute between the Serbs and Croats, the two largest nationalities of Yugoslavia, on whose cooperation was premised the idea of a South Slav state. For a time after World War II, it seemed this quarrel would be solved. The events of the late 1960s, marked by growing national tensions and the reemergence of the Serb-Croat controversy, dashed these hopes. Since that time there has been little basic improvement in Serb-Croat relations, although the economic problems which initially sparked the dispute between the two republics have been largely resolved, and relations between the two republics within the federal government and parliament are no longer marked by open acrimony.

The Serb-Croat quarrel is the best known controversy associated with the national question, but there are others of almost equal importance which have played a major role in shaping national relations in postwar Yugoslavia. The Slovenians in the north, while giving their support to the Yugoslav state, have fiercely defended their more advanced standard of living against the economic encroachments of the federal government and the remaining five republics. In one well-known incident in which their economic interests had been violated, the Slovenians let the rumor circulate that they were considering "secession" from Yugoslavia. The Macedonians in the south have muted their irredentist claims to territory in neighboring Greece and Bulgaria, but they remain deeply involved in a quarrel with the Bulgarians over the rights of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, an issue which could spark a conflict between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The Albanians, now more numerous than both the Macedonians and Montenegrins, harbor deep grievances against the Slav nationalities. The Albanians wish to see Kosovo raised to the level of a republic, giving the Albanians the status of a "nation," and placing them on an equal footing with the Slav nationalities of Yugoslavia.

Over the years the United States has wisely avoided direct involvement in the national question in Yugoslavia, but this has not prevented the issue from arising in the conduct of American foreign policy. The dispute over Trieste, resolved by the London memorandum of 1954, for a time threatened Yugoslav-American relations. For several years after World War II, the Yugoslav Communists supported the Communist insurgency in Greece with the aid of Macedonian Communists, a policy abandoned after the break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948. In recent years the United States has been compelled to deal increasingly with the

republics over a wide range of issues as a result of the drastic limitations placed on the responsibilities of the federal government by the constitution of 1974. On another front, the activities of Croatian and Serbian terrorist groups in the United States have awakened the public to the existence of nationalist movements in Yugoslavia and obliged the American government to learn more about the background and demands of these groups.

But it is the specter of a rapid deterioration of the political situation in Yugoslavia following Tito's death which dictates growing concern in this country over Yugoslavia's national question. So great is the strategic importance of Yugoslavia, and so high are the political stakes involved, that it is already possible to foresee the danger of a great-power confrontation over Yugoslavia arising in the post-Tito period. In some respects, indeed, the post-Tito period has already begun.

Yugoslavia after Tito

What are the possibilities of a serious crisis developing in Yugoslavia, one in which the United States might become involved? There are several hopeful signs that a serious crisis can be avoided. One is the success the Yugoslav leaders have had in keeping the national question under control since 1971. This has been accomplished by severely limiting all manifestations of nationalism, while permitting the republics and provinces a great deal of freedom to pursue their economic interests. In addition, decentralization and the new federal system have placed the burden of responsibility for economic development on the republics and provinces, thereby reducing controversy over the use of federal funds for development purposes and giving the republics a vested interest in the continued functioning of the federal system.

Another important development, one which in the short run helps ease the transition to the post-Tito period, concerns the question of Tito's successor. As a result of changes in the organization of the Party leadership bodies over the past year, the possibility of a struggle for power following Tito's death has been reduced. In both Party and state organs, the principle of collective leadership is to prevail.*

---

* The State Presidency, a collective leadership body, will assume Tito's powers as President of Yugoslavia when Tito dies. The Party statute provides for a president of the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY) with great powers. In recent years, Edvard Kardelj and Stane Dolanc were prime contenders for this position. Last spring Dolanc gained the upper hand when it became clear that Kardelj was fatally ill with cancer (Kardelj died in February). Perhaps out of a fear

Finally, the Yugoslav Party leadership has itself changed in recent years, and this change has its counterpart in the make-up of the Party membership. The liberals and nationalists of the 1960s have been largely purged from leadership positions and from the ranks of the Party. In their place has emerged a basically more conservative leadership in which Party *apparatchiki* and former military and security officers play an important role. They can be expected to cooperate closely with the military and security forces in Yugoslavia, whose position today is quite strong. Together, these elements can be counted on to oppose demands made by the republics or by the national minorities which might threaten the country's stability and security.

It is nevertheless possible to paint a more somber picture, and it is one to which this writer inclines. The Yugoslav leaders have set the country on a bold new path with their radical measures of decentralization and reform. At the same time they have run great risks. The federal system is extremely unwieldy, for it grants each republic and province in Yugoslavia the right to veto economic and social legislation of which it does not approve. (Matters of defense and foreign affairs fall primarily but not exclusively under the jurisdiction of the federal government.) Deadlocks have occurred in the national assembly, but up until now they have not proven insurmountable, in part because of the influence of the League of Communists and also because the republics have learned to some extent to compromise their interests for the good of the whole. On more important issues, above all those concerned with basic institutional and economic reforms, Tito's influence has nevertheless proven decisive. His removal as the "ultimate ar-

---

of the growing power of Dolanc, the Executive Committee of the LCY, which Dolanc controlled by virtue of his position as Party Secretary, was abolished at the 11th Party Congress held in June. The new Party statute adopted at the time invested primary decision-making power in the 24-man Presidium. In November the position of the Presidium was enhanced and the powers of the president of the LCY in the post-Tito period curtailed, by the creation of the post of "Chairman of the Presidium." The post will rotate among members of the Presidium, presumably on the basis of a nationality key. With the authorization of the president of the LCY, the chairman can preside over meetings of the Presidium. Following this move, a campaign for collective leadership was initiated in Yugoslavia (the moment chosen coincided with Dolanc's absence from the country). The net effects of these moves is to make it almost certain that the Presidium will, after Tito's death, form a collective leadership body, and that whoever assumes the post of president of the LCY will find his powers greatly circumscribed.

biter" will therefore have an impact on the functioning of the federal system and its ability to operate under the rules of unanimity now in force.

Once Tito's restraining influence is lifted, it is also likely that the republics will express their differences, especially over economic matters, more openly. To an extent this has already begun to take place. While in certain respects this openness is a commendable step towards greater democracy, it runs a real risk of arousing public opinion. The situation is apt to grow worse if the republics begin to appeal for public support in their controversies with one another.

The leadership fears that even a moderate increase in national tensions would lead to the revival of nationalistic demands rejected up to now as too extreme. Among such demands might be republic status for Kosovo, a greater voice for the republics in foreign affairs, greater powers for the republic parties at the expense of the LCY, changes in educational policies vis-à-vis the national minorities, and so forth. The leadership would then be faced with a dilemma: either to begin a new round of concessions to nationalism or to stand firm, thus running the risk of provoking intransigence on the part of the republics or provinces concerned. Such a threat could not be taken lightly, given the ability of each of the republics and provinces to obstruct the business of the federal government and the Party under the provisions of the constitution and the Party statute.

Events of the past decade have tended to obscure that, unless the military and security forces intervene directly, the republics are in a strong position in their dealings with the federal government and may soon be equally powerful in any confrontation with the Party leadership. Ten years ago this was not the case. The constitutional reforms of 1971 and 1974 and the reorganization of the Party's leadership over the past year have greatly enhanced the ability of the republics to block policies of which they do not approve, recall deputies in leading Party and state bodies who do not follow orders, and bend Party and state policy by "stonewalling" tactics. That these powers have not been exploited up to now must be attributed as much to the strong leadership provided by Tito, Kardelj, and Dolanc--and a political climate hostile to republic nationalism--as to republic restraint and moderation. Now Kardelj is dead and Dolanc removed from his post as Party Secretary. Once Tito passes from the scene, there will be no one with sufficient personal authority to curb republic demands, or to break deadlocks among the republics as they occur.

The United States must anticipate that the post-Tito period will be marked by greater assertiveness on the part of republics and a higher level of instability than has marked the Yugoslav political

scene heretofore. The republics can be expected to pursue their economic demands with increasing vigor, and politics will more and more come to revolve around trade-offs of republic interests. Coalitions of republics may emerge reflecting traditional ties or common interests. This process will inevitably be accompanied by increased foreign aid to the republics and by the growth of republic influence on the conduct of foreign policy. Whether the situation deteriorates to an all-out confrontation depends upon the willingness of the republics and provinces to exercise restraint in pushing for purely nationalistic objectives. Such demands would quickly bring the republics, provinces, and nationalities into sharp conflict. A demand to elevate Kosovo to republic status would be bitterly resisted by Serbia. Any attempt by Croatia to introduce a common language in the schools in Croatia would arouse resistance among the Serbian minority in Croatia and trigger a reaction against Croatia in Serbia. Actions of the Montenegrins directed against the Slav Moslem element in Montenegro would meet with a strong reaction from Bosnia-Hercegovina, and so forth.

The military and security forces would limit such a process if it threatened the underlying stability of Yugoslavia. The republic leaders, for their part, would not wish to see the conflicts of nationalities develop to the point where military intervention in political life was imminent. Thus, competition among the republics would probably be marked by efforts at compromise to prevent a truly precipitous decline in the country's stability.

Massive military intervention from without seems unlikely in such a situation. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact forces would have little to gain from a military strike against Yugoslavia. Even if initially successful, such an action would unite the Serbs, Croats, and remaining nationalities under the leadership of the Party against the occupying forces. The result could only be prolonged guerilla warfare with incalculable consequences for the Soviet Union and her allies.

On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union will remain aloof from the Yugoslav situation in the post-Tito period, for the opportunities for involvement in the country's internal affairs are bound to expand. Such involvement can take the form of economic assistance, increased cultural and political contacts, and a sympathetic ear for republic claims. At some point the Soviet Union might be tempted to choose sides, perhaps counting on the traditional sympathies of the Montenegrins and Serbs for Russia to back the interests of these two republics. Alternatively, the Soviet Union could offer a sympathetic ear to the military by reassuring them of the interest of the Soviet Union in the integrity of the Yugoslav state, seeking in this fashion to establish a special relationship with this group. The Soviet Union will be in a stronger position than the United States to influence, in both

a positive and negative sense, the course of events in Yugoslavia in the years ahead. It is capable of, and probably willing to engage in, acts of "disinformation" to which the Yugoslavs, because of their heightened national sensibilities, are extremely vulnerable. The Soviet Union can also with enthusiasm throw its backing to a centralistically-minded regime which, with military support, might be propelled into power by the need to end republic strife.

In the end, it is possible that a modification of the "republico-centric" system will be forced upon the country, even if such a step involved a major political and constitutional crisis. There are at least two scenarios of how this might take place.

The military and the more conservative elements in the Party and state leadership could decide to take action before the supporters of republic rule could organize themselves, namely, at the moment of Tito's death. This step would be facilitated by the declaration of a state of emergency in anticipation of forays of terrorist groups into Yugoslavia. It would have a greater chance of success if the Soviet Union were to cooperate by creating a mock crisis on Yugoslavia's borders, perhaps by encouraging the Bulgarians to make threatening gestures towards Macedonia. The objective of the groups behind such a move would be not to place the military in power, but to force a political confrontation in which those favoring centralized rule would be left in control of the Party and state apparatus and the republics would agree to a lesser role in exchange for an end to the crisis. This is not likely, but it is not to be ruled out.

A more likely eventuality is the emergence of a "law and order" faction with representatives in all republics but with strongholds in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Vojvodina. Such a group would form the nucleus of a movement designed to reverse the trend toward republic autonomy and would be strongly conservative as well as cautiously pro-Soviet. With a few defections from other republics, this group could probably muster a majority of votes in the Party Presidium and State Presidency, and it would therefore seek, in every way possible, to dilute collective leadership and the right of the republics to exercise a veto power over the actions of the federal government and the national assembly. As part of its strategy, this coalition might play a waiting game, in the expectation that one of the republics not in the group (notably Croatia) would be goaded into employing obstructionist tactics which would isolate it and provide the opposing faction with a favorable moment to act. The objective would be to tip the political balance in a direction favorable to the centralizers and their law and order supporters, thus paving the way for constitutional changes which would return the country to a modified form of centralized rule.

There are other possible scenarios. Nevertheless, American policy-makers must pay close attention to developments in Yugoslavia over the next several years and be prepared for situations which may not be in accord with American interests.

There is little doubt that this policy calls for maintaining and strengthening exchange programs with Yugoslavia. While past exchange participants have been interested in the national question, there is still a need for persons who would be willing to undertake their research outside the main cities of Belgrade and Zagreb. Such research, to be of value from this policy perspective, need not necessarily involve the national question; indeed, research proposals relating to themes directly touching on sensitive national issues would probably prove unacceptable to the Yugoslavs. Any research which improves our understanding of life in the republics and the attitudes of the nationalities would be useful. It is unfortunate that in the past there has been a tendency to seek such information through organizing sample surveys (when permitted), or through relying on impressions of peripatetic journalists and scholars. The best way to gain knowledge of other peoples, in my opinion, is through sustained contact at the personal level, something that is best accomplished within the framework of long-term exchanges.

There is nothing sinister in this process if it promotes our understanding of other peoples. It is unfortunate that in the past the Yugoslavs have on occasion looked upon persons doing field work outside the major cities as possible foreign agents. This distrust extends to any research project on the national minorities and, to a lesser extent, the national question in general. In fact, as we know, most of those who have been on the exchange become part of the community of scholars and experts dealing with Yugoslavia upon their return--a group of well-informed persons sympathetic to Yugoslavia's problems, who certainly do not intend the country any harm.

At home the problem is to encourage persons who have been on the exchange to share their knowledge and experiences with others and to keep up contacts with Yugoslavia. In the past several years two conferences on Yugoslavia were held at which special efforts were made to bring together young scholars interested in the country. The gratifying turnout in both cases is proof that there exists a high level of scholarly interest in Yugoslavia in the United States, and that a younger generation of Yugoslav experts is being trained. Practically all of these persons have at one time or another participated in the exchange program with Yugoslavia.

The Nationalities Situation Elsewhere in Eastern Europe

For the rest of Eastern Europe, the question of nationalities and national minorities remains important, if not as urgent as in Yugoslavia. In Poland, the minority population has declined drastically since the prewar period as the result of the liquidation of the Jews during World War II, the loss of the eastern portions of the country to the Soviet Union, and the expulsion of the Germans from the newly acquired "Western territories." Nevertheless there remain in Poland a number of Germans who did not emigrate and whom the Poles have refused to recognize as a minority. Estimates have varied widely concerning the size of this group. German figures ran as high as 300,000 in 1976; Polish estimates for the same year placed the number at 125,000. As Kosinski has noted,* the exact number will never be known, since many of these persons are of mixed Polish-German origin, or are largely assimilated into the Polish population. The Polish government agreed that 125,000 could emigrate to West Germany under the provisions of the 1976 treaty between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. No other country in Eastern Europe has permitted such a large number of Germans to leave in recent years.

In East Germany there are virtually no minorities, but there does exist a small group of approximately 40,000 largely assimilated Sorbs, located in Saxony. (In 1947 spokesmen for the Sorbs made an appeal to the occupying powers for the creation of a Sorb state, to be called "Lusatia.") In Hungary there exists a small German minority whose number was officially given as 35,000 in the 1970 census, but whose actual number is probably closer to 200,000, by the Hungarians' own estimate. Albania has a small Greek minority; in 1955, according to the most recent Albanian figures, they amounted to 35,000, or 3 percent of the Albanian population. (Greek figures, highly inflated, set the size of the Greek minority at 300,000!)

In Czechoslovakia today the minority population is quite small, amounting to approximately 4 percent of the population. Practically all of these are Hungarians. In Romania, according to the provisional results of the 1977 census, there were 2.5 million, or 11.6 percent of the population, who were not of Romanian nationality. Of these, 1.7 million were Hungarians, the rest mostly German. In addition, as many as four million Romanians may still be left in the Soviet Union, the bulk of these in the Moldavian SSR.**

---

* Leszek Kosinski (ed.), *Demographic Developments in Eastern Europe* (1977), p. 329.

** Official Soviet census figures gave the number of Romanians residing in the Soviet Union as 119,000.

In Bulgaria, Turks, Macedonians, and Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Moslems) make up the three largest minority groups. According to the official census figures of 1965, minorities constituted 12.1 percent of the population. In actual fact, the number is probably considerably larger. The number of Turks has been estimated at over one million in 1975, or 11.4 percent of the population. According to official figures, there was a Macedonian minority in 1956 of 187,000. By 1965 this number had dropped to 9,362. In 1975 it was officially reported that there was no longer a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. In 1978 the Swiss journalist Viktor Meir toured the area of Pirin Macedonia and reported that many of the inhabitants with whom he spoke considered themselves Macedonian. It may well be, therefore, that there are still persons in Bulgaria who consider themselves Macedonian, perhaps as many as 150,000 to 200,000. If an equal number of Pomaks is added to this figure and the Turk population is estimated at around one million, then the minority population in Bulgaria today would be around 17.4 percent. Adding gypsies to this number would increase the number of non-Bulgarians to 23 percent of the total population, the highest percentage in Eastern Europe.

It is not possible to deal adequately with the ramifications of the dispute over the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria here. In the last analysis, minority rights--whether the Macedonians in Bulgaria should have their own schools and cultural associations, or whether their dialect should be recognized as a separate language--are not the issue. Rather the problem is whether there exists a Macedonian nationality at all, either in Yugoslavia or in Bulgaria.

Since the late 1960s the Bulgarians have more and more taken the position that no such nationality exists. This has played into the hands of the Yugoslavs, whose ultimate purpose, behind the hue and cry over the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, is to persuade their own Macedonian population that they are better off where they are than under Bulgarian rule. While the Yugoslavs would welcome a settlement of the issue of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria on terms favorable to themselves, at the same time the Yugoslavs are not completely unhappy with the present situation, since it blocks any rapprochement between the People's Republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria.

Paradoxically, a Soviet move to force the Bulgarians to accept the Yugoslav position on the Macedonian issue would be viewed as a destabilizing step. It would indicate a desire on the Soviet side to establish an advantageous position in the period of uncertainty following Tito's death, even at the expense of the Soviets' closest East European ally. This move could also be interpreted, in the context of a succession crisis, as a step toward active Bulgarian involvement in the Yugoslav national question. (In the period

after the 1948 break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union the Bulgarians tried the tactic of appealing to Macedonian nationalism. In fact, this is an old Bulgarian maneuver, going back to the organization of the "Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organization" in the 1890s as a way of gaining control of the Macedonian national movement.) Thus, things are not always what they seem in the maneuvers surrounding nationalities disputes in Eastern Europe.

The Eastern European Nationalities Question: Principles of a Future American Policy

What can the United States do to see that its interests are not adversely affected in these very complicated nationalities and minorities disputes in Eastern Europe? Especially, what should guide our policy with respect to the potentially serious situation that could emerge in Yugoslavia in the next several years?

The golden rule in these cases would seem to be non-involvement. On the surface this would seem to pose no problem, for it is the position, by and large, that the United States has taken up to now. (We might note that there has been no particular enthusiasm shown by the United States to link the issue of human rights in Eastern Europe with minority problems.) However, this position might have to be reconsidered, or might be hard to sustain if Yugoslavia becomes unstable, because the United States is not, in fact, indifferent to the direction in which national relations unfold in Yugoslavia. Historically the U.S., along with its Western allies, has supported the integrity of Yugoslavia. But what if this involves increased Soviet influence there? If we should ever face the prospect of a partitioned Yugoslavia free of Soviet control, or a Yugoslav state, intact, with close ties to the Soviet Union, which would we prefer? Would this not depend, in turn, on the state of our relations with the Soviet Union, that is, our perception of the Soviet threat?

Such questions need to be raised. The likelihood of "destablization" in Yugoslavia is real after Tito's death, and the Soviet Union is in a better position to take advantage of this situation than the U.S. The possibility of the United States being drawn into this situation is also real; any escalation of the crisis could come to depend on the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

In my view, the United States is best served in the short run by policies aimed at sustaining a stable Yugoslavia and promoting the economic welfare of the country. There is much that can be done both by the United States and Western Europe (especially the EEC) to further this end. In the long run, it would be reassuring to

see the United States and the Soviet Union recommit themselves to détente, to stability in Europe (including Eastern Europe), and to a course of action designed to reduce the general level of mistrust on both sides. Such a policy would not exclude, but be premised on, non-involvement in Yugoslavia's domestic affairs. Finally, it is a policy that is more apt to succeed if we have some perception, now, of the dilemmas we may face if national harmony does not prevail in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period.

PAUL SHOUP is a professor in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. A graduate of Swarthmore College, he received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1960. An IREX exchange fellow to Yugoslavia in 1977-1978, Mr. Shoup has recently published *The League of Communists of Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) and has completed *The East European and Soviet Data Handbook: Social, Political and Developmental Indicators, 1945-1975* (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).